A variety of recent theoretical and empirical advances have renewed interest in monopsonistic models of the labor market. However, there is little direct empirical support for these models, even in labor markets that are textbook examples of monopsony. We use an exogenous change in wages at Veterans Affairs hospitals as a natural experiment to investigate the extent of monopsony in the nurse labor market. In contrast to much of the prior literature, we estimate that labor supply to individual hospitals is quite inelastic, with short-run elasticity around 0.1. We also find that non-VA hospitals responded to the VA wage change by changing their own wages.
Introduction
Standard competitive models assume that individual firms are price-takers in the labor market. However, since Robinson (1933) first coined the term "monopsony," economists have considered the alternative case in which individual firms face upward sloping labor supply curves and, therefore, have market power which enables them to set wages. Originally, monopsony power was thought to exist primarily in fairly specialized labor markets, in which a single firm bought labor in an isolated labor market (analogous to a monopolist in a product market). More recently, a variety of theoretical models have suggested that monopsonistic behavior may be pervasive, with individual firms facing upward-sloping labor supply curves because of the presence of oligopoly, differentiation between firms, moving costs, costly job search, or efficiency wages (Boal and Ransom, 1997) .
Empirical evidence of monopsony is quite mixed (see Boal and Ransom, 1997, for a recent review). On the one hand, monopsony provides a possible explanation for a variety of facts that are difficult to explain in the competitive model. For example, monopsony has been used to explain why an increase in the minimum wage led to an increase in employment (Card and Krueger, 1995) , why there is a positive relationship between firm size and wages (Green, Machin and Manning, 1996) , and why there are persistent differences across firms in wages and vacancy rates (Boal and Ransom, 1997; Card and Krueger, 1995; Yett, 1975) . On the other hand, direct estimation of the elasticity of labor supply to individual firms suggests that firms have very little market power over wages even in labor markets that are textbook examples of monopsony such as nurses (Sullivan, 1989; Hansen, 1992) and coal miners (Boal, 1995) . This paper investigates whether individual hospitals have monopsony power in the labor market for Registered Nurses (RNs). The RN labor market is a popular textbook example of monopsony (e.g., Ehrenberg and Smith, 1987) because of persistent variations in wages across regions and across hospitals, along with nearly continuous reports of shortages since World War II (Yett, 1975; Aiken, 1982; Roberts, et al., 1989; Greene and Nordhaus-Bike, 1998) . Thus, if one found no evidence of monopsony power in this market, it would be difficult to argue that monopsony was a pervasive feature of the labor market.
We analyze the effect of an exogenous, legislated change in RN wages at Veterans Administration (VA) hospitals. Our analysis differs in two important ways from the prior literature estimating monopsony power at the firm level. First, previous studies have used measures of output demand as instruments for wages in estimating the supply elasticity. In contrast, our source of identification comes from a legislated change in wages at certain hospitals. Thus, our empirical approach relies on a similar source of identification as that used in recent studies of the minimum wage (Card and Krueger, 1995) . Arguably, this legislated change in wages provides the perfect "natural experiment" with which to answer the key question: does an exogenous change in wages at one hospital affect employment at that hospital or at competing hospitals? A second difference from the prior literature is that our empirical analysis is explicitly motivated by a model of geographic differentiation among firms, similar to Salop (1979) , in which hospitals compete directly only with their nearest neighbors. This model suggests that other hospitals will change their wages in response to the VA wage change, and the response will be largest at hospitals that are nearest to the VA.
Our empirical results are consistent with the presence of monopsony power in the RN labor market, generated by geographic differentiation between hospitals. We find that wages at non-VA hospitals responded to the VA wage change, and this response was largest among hospitals located within 15 miles of a VA hospital. In addition, we find that RN employment at individual hospitals responded very little in the short run to the resulting changes in relative wages between hospitals. Our estimates of the short-run elasticity of labor supply to an individual hospital average around 0.1, far lower than previous estimates in the literature. Overall, this evidence suggests that hospitals are wage-setters in the RN labor market, with considerable market power.
Previous studies of monopsony in nursing
Studies of monopsony in the nursing labor market have been motivated by two observations. First, in rural regions, there may be only one hospital and few other employers for registered nurses, potentially providing RN employers with market power. Second, as stated above, there have been persistent reports of nursing shortages since the 1940s. Research on nursing labor markets has provided conflicting evidence about the monopsony hypothesis.
Studies of nursing monopsony generally have taken two approaches. One line of literature has examined whether there is a relationship between labor market concentration and wage levels in cross-sectional analyses. Several studies have found that RN wages are lower when there are fewer hospitals or when hospital markets are more concentrated (Hurd, 1973; Link and Landon, 1975; Bruggink, et al., 1985; Robinson, 1988) . However, studies that more carefully adjust for other area specific factors, such as the cost of living, find no evidence that market concentration per se is associated with lower wages (Adamache and Sloan, 1982; Feldman and Scheffler, 1982; Hirsch and Schumacher, 1995) .
A more recent approach has sought to explicitly estimate the elasticity or inverse elasticity of labor supply to an individual hospital. In a simple static model of monopsony, the inverse elasticity of labor supply is a measure of "exploitation" analogous to the Lerner index, and equals the percentage amount that the wage lies below marginal revenue product (see Boal and Ransom, 1997) . Sullivan (1989) estimated a wage elasticity of supply to individual hospitals of 1.26 over a one year period and 3.85 over a three year period using a national sample of hospitals from 1980 to 1985. In contrast, Hansen (1992) , using an almost identical methodology, found that supply was very elastic in California from 1980 to 1987. Hansen's estimates of the labor supply elasticity ranged from 29 to 56. In a dynamic model these short-run elasticity estimates will overstate the amount of exploitation if labor supply is more elastic in the long run. Under reasonable assumptions, even Sullivan's estimates suggest that monopsony power is small in this market, with RN wages no more than 10 percent below their competitive level (Boal and Ransom, 1997) .
There are two reasons to believe that these estimates may overstate the short-run supply elasticity (and thereby understate the amount of monopsony power). First, in both papers hospital days are assumed to be exogenous demand shifters and serve as instruments in estimating the supply curve by two stage least squares (2SLS).
Therefore, these papers' 2SLS estimates of elasticities greater than 1 reflect the fact that for a given decline in hospital days, we observed RN employment to fall by more (often much more) than RN wages. However, reimbursement of hospitals changed dramatically over this period with the introduction of Medicare's Prospective Payment System in 1984, and hospitals responded to this change by reducing days spent in the hospital (Coulam and Gaumer, 1991) . This suggests that much of the observed variation in hospital days over the early 1980s was endogenous. If hospital days were chosen endogenously, one would expect a positive association between the error in the supply equation and hospital days. This would bias the 2SLS method towards overstating the positive relationship between hospital days and RN employment, and therefore bias upward the estimate of the elasticity of supply.
A second reason to believe that these estimates may overstate the short-run supply elasticity is that both studies measure the wage using the average RN wage in the hospital. If a wage increase results in disproportionate hiring at the entry level, and entry level workers are paid less, then the change in the average wage will tend to understate the actual change in the wage (because of the shift toward entry-level workers). As a result, estimates of the labor supply elasticity will be biased upwards (Boal and Ransom, 1997, fn. 25) .
RN wages and the VA policy
In 1991, the VA went from paying RNs based on a national scale to a system that set RN wages based on a local wage survey. This legislated change in RN wages at VA hospitals provides an ideal opportunity to examine whether there is monopsony in the RN labor market, while avoiding many of the problems of the previous literature. A short panel of data is available for VA and non-VA hospitals with complete information on staffing levels, patient caseloads, wages (including starting wages), and other hospital characteristics. The data can be first-differenced to control for variation in the cost of living and unmeasured attributes of hospitals. Finally, no assumptions need to be made about exogenous demand shocks, since the legislation generates exogenous changes in wages at VA hospitals, and these changes can in turn be used to construct instruments for wage changes at competing non-VA hospitals.
Prior to 1991, the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) set registered nurse (RN) wages in all of its hospitals according to a national pay scale, with only minor adjustments to wages for hospitals in high wage markets. This policy seriously affected the VA's ability to recruit and retain RNs for two reasons. First, VA wages tended to lag behind the market throughout the 1980s, as real wages of RNs rose rapidly. More importantly, this policy caused VA wages to diverge from those of local labor markets, because nurse wages vary widely across regions. VA hospitals could respond somewhat to market conditions by obtaining waivers from the VA Central Office for wage increases. Although the waiver system improved the ability of VA hospitals to match market wages, the waivers were constrained by VA budgets and were often granted after local wages had risen further. For example, based on data from 1990 (see section 5, below), starting RN wages in Milwaukee -a relatively low wage market -averaged $11.20/hour at non-VA hospitals while the VA starting wage was competitive at $11.65/hour. However, in San Francisco -a relatively high wage market --the VA wage lagged well behind the market, with non-VA hospitals paying an average hourly wage of $16.30 and the local VA hospitals paying only $14.00.
The VA sought to remedy this problem with the passage of the Nurse Pay Act of 1990, which changed how the VA set wages for RNs, effective April 7, 1991. This law tied RN wages at each VA hospital to those that prevail in its local labor market, with market wages determined by an annual survey of other hospitals in each VA's region. 1 As a result, wage scales of RNs were immediately raised to match the market in the roughly two-thirds of VA hospitals that had been paying below the prevailing market wage. 2 At the remaining VA hospitals that were paying above market, wages were held constant in nominal terms until they came in line with the prevailing market wage.
Thus the law generated an exogenous change in RN wages at VA hospitals, with the magnitude of the wage change varying across hospitals.
In addition to mandating wage changes, the Nurse Pay Act of 1990 provided each VA with additional funds in its budget to finance their increased wage bill. As a result, individual VA hospitals that had their wages raised by the act were free to hire additional RNs up to previously determined staffing needs (which were well above staffing levels for nearly all VA hospitals), with the costs being passed on to the central office. Thus, VA hospitals were essentially free to hire all nurses willing to work at the legislated wage level.
In summary, the Nurse Pay Act of 1990 provides a unique opportunity to examine the extent of monopsony power in the nurse labor market. We can estimate the elasticity of supply of RNs to individual hospitals based on a legislated change in the wage, unrelated to changes in supply shocks, at VA hospitals in which labor demand was not binding. Moreover, we can learn to what extent hospitals have wage setting power by observing whether non-VA hospitals adjusted their wages in response to the change in VA wages.
Theoretical model
Consider a general model of monopsony in which firms face a labor supply curve that is upward sloping in their own wage and downward sloping in the wage of competitors:
A profit-maximizing firm will set wages to maximize R(Li) -Li*wi, where R(.) is the firm's revenue function, Li is the firm's employment, and wi, is the firm's wage. The first-order condition for this problem implies:
Where MRP is the marginal revenue product of labor, and ε is the own-wage elasticity of labor supply. Thus, the own-wage elasticity of labor supply is the key to measuring monopsony power, and summarizes the extent to which a firm may reduce wages below the competitive level.
To guide our empirical work, we consider a simplified version of equation (1).
Our model is an application of Salop's (1979) model of competition around a circle. We assume RNs are distributed uniformly around a circle, and they choose to work at one of N hospitals. Given our focus on short-run labor supply, we ignore the issue of hospital entry and exit, and treat N as fixed. 3 Hospitals are located equidistant around the circle, with the distance between hospitals (and the number of nurses located between hospitals) equal to α. A nurse located between two hospitals will choose to work at the hospital at which the wage net of travel costs is highest. Letting τ represent the travel costs per unit distance, it is straightforward to derive the labor supply facing a given hospital as a function of its own wage and the wage of its nearest competitors:
where wi-1 and wi+1 are wages at the two adjacent hospitals. Thus, the simple structure of competition along a circle yields a labor supply equation that depends only on the gap between a hospital's wage and the average wage of its two nearest competitors.
Total labor supply to the market is assumed fixed (e.g. a doubling of all wages does not affect the labor supply to any individual hospital).
Wages at the VA are set exogenously by federal policy, but wages at all other hospitals are assumed to be set endogenously. If the marginal benefit to a hospital of employing a nurse is β, we assume that hospitals set wages to maximize the total net benefits derived from RNs; i.e., they choose w to maximize L(β-w). The first order condition for this maximization problem provides the wage setting equation (i.e., labor demand) for the model:
Thus, wages are set below marginal product and the size of the wage mark-down depends on the slope of the labor supply equation (3).
Equations (3) and (4) would be identical and the solution would be a symmetric wage equilibrium with w* = βατ. Our model is not symmetric, since the VA hospital differs from all non-VA hospitals in that its wage is set exogenously. Therefore, the equilibrium is asymmetric with equilibrium wages at non-VA hospitals depending on the distance between each hospital and the VA. Distance is measured by the number of hospitals (d) located between a given hospital and the VA (e.g. d=0 for the two hospitals located adjacent to the VA).
If there is only one VA hospital setting wages exogenously in each market, then (after some algebra) equilibrium wages at non-VA hospitals can be shown to be a weighted average of the VA wage (w VA ) and the symmetric equilibrium wage (w*):
The weight placed on the VA wage (θi) captures the effect of VA wage on wages at non-VA hospitals, and depends only on the number of hospitals (N) in the market and on each hospital's distance from the VA (d). It is straightforward to derive three useful properties of θi in this model. First, θi is between 0 and 1/2 which implies that non-VA (5)).
Data
The data used in this study are obtained from several publicly available sources and from the VA's records. hospitals and wages at hospitals that compete with the VA hospitals. We also use these data to check the accuracy of the NPS data in 1990.
Cross-checks of the different data reveal little inconsistency in our measures of wages, employment levels, and hospital characteristics. This alleviates any concern arising from the fact that the NPS and AHA data are based on hospital responses to surveys. Similarly, the VA accounting data should be of high quality, since they are from an internal accounting system instead of survey responses. While it is likely that some measurement error exists in our data, we do not believe that it is sufficiently large to bias the results of this study. Finally, to control for differences in the cost of living and local labor market conditions, we construct dummy variables for the CMSA/MSA in which each hospital is located and, for rural hospitals, dummy variables for the remainder of the state. wages increased more between 1990 and 1992 (12.5 percent) than did wages at non-VA hospitals (9.9 percent), and the variation in wage growth was larger at VA hospitals as well. Growth in employment also was more rapid at VA hospitals, with RN FTEs increasing by 8.3 percent as compared to 5.6 percent in non-VA hospitals. Thus, VA wages increased by 2.6 percent more than non-VA wages following the Nurse Pay Act, and VA employment increased by 2.7 percent more than non-VA employment. These estimates suggest a labor supply elasticity of around 1, although the standard error on this simple Wald estimate is over 0.7.
The remaining variables in Table 1 describe the ownership and location of the hospitals in our sample. Just over 10 percent of the sample are VA hospitals. Non-VA hospitals are, on average, 23 miles from the nearest VA, with over half of the sample more than 15 miles from the nearest VA and about one third more than 30 miles. On average, both VA and non-VA hospitals have more than 10 competitors within a 15 mile radius, although there is significant variation in the number of competitors.
Empirical Analysis

Reduced Form Wage Equations for Non-VA Hospitals
We examine the effect of the VA's wage changes on wages at other hospitals by estimating the reduced-form wage equation (5) in differenced form:
where wi is the wage at a non-VA hospital, wi VA is the wage at the nearest VA hospital to hospital i, and D15i and D30i are dummy variables which equal one if hospital i is more than 15 or more than 30 miles from a VA. We take the difference of each variable between 1990 and 1992 to control for hospital characteristics which are constant over time. As discussed above, we expect α1 > 0 and α2 , α3 < 0; i.e., the change in the VA wage should have a positive effect on the wage change in other hospitals, but this effect should decline in magnitude as hospitals are further from the VA.
Estimates of equation 6 are presented in Table 2 . The dependent variable in all the regressions is the change in the log wage of RNs at non-VA hospitals. Several variations of this equation were estimated. The first column includes only the change in the log wage at the nearest VA. The second column interacts the VA wage change with two dummy variables: one for whether the hospital is more than 15 miles from a VA and another for whether there is more than a 30 mile distance. The third column adds MSA dummy variables to allow for area specific trends in wages. Finally, the fourth column adds dummy variables for being more than 15 and 30 miles from a VA.
The results for all specifications are consistent with the theory. The VA wage change has a positive and significant effect on wages at neighboring hospitals, but this effect is significantly smaller (about half the magnitude) in hospitals that are 15-30 miles from a VA, and disappears almost entirely for hospitals more than 30 miles from a VA hospital. For example, in the first column we estimate that the elasticity of wages at non-VA hospitals with respect to the VA wage is .128, i.e. a 1.28 percent increase in response to a 10 percent increase in the wage at the nearest VA. In the second column we allow the effect of the VA wage to vary with distance to the VA. The estimated elasticity increases to .178 for hospitals within 15 miles of a VA (the reference group), but is significantly lower for hospitals 15-30 miles from the VA (.100), and lower still for hospitals more than 30 miles from the VA (.051). 5 Results for the remaining specifications are quite similar.
Changes in the VA wage were not entirely determined by the law since VA hospitals had some discretion in determining which hospitals to survey in setting 1992 wages. Thus, some of the positive correlation between VA wage growth and wage growth at nearby hospitals may reflect the VA's response to wages at other hospitals.
The gap between the market wage and the VA wage in 1990 is used in Table 3 as a proxy that predicts the wage growth that resulted from the Nurse Pay Act. This wage gap in 1990 is not influenced by the VA's later actions. The first column of Table 3 estimates the relationship between this proxy and actual wage growth between 1990
and 1992 at the VA hospitals. There is a very strong relationship between the wage gap that existed for each VA in 1990 and each VA's subsequent wage growth, with a precisely estimated coefficient on the wage gap that is near one and an R-squared on this simple regression of just over 0.5.
The remaining columns of Table 3 (columns II-V) estimate the same specifications as in Table 2 for non-VA hospitals using the wage gap from 1990 in place of actual wage growth at the nearest VA. The results are quite similar to those of Table   2 (although the estimated elasticities are noticeably larger when MSA dummies are included). In particular, the wage gap has a positive, statistically significant effect on wage growth at non-VAs, and this effect is smaller at hospitals that are further from the VA.
The first two columns of Table 4 examine this possibility. Column III presents the coefficients of an equation for non-VA hospitals with a positive wage gap at the nearest VA (i.e., the VA wage is lower than the market wage). As expected, the VA wage change has a large, statistically significant effect on non-VA hospitals' wages. Column IV presents the same equation for hospitals for which the VA wage gap is negative. Where the VAMC paid more than the market, and thus didn't change its wages with the Nurse Pay Act, the VA wage gap has no effect on the wages of other hospitals.
Labor Supply Equations for All Hospitals
We estimate the labor supply equation (3) in a first-difference form to measure the elasticity of supply of RNs:
Li is the number of RN FTEs employed at hospital i (for VAs and other hospitals), wi is the wage at hospital i, and lnwj is the average log wage at hospital i's two nearest competitors. θ1 is the elasticity of supply of RNs to an individual hospital. We found evidence of heteroskedasticity in the error, and therefore weight all regressions by the number of beds at the hospital in 1990.
As discussed earlier, OLS estimates of equation (5) are biased. We estimate equation (7) using two-stage least squares. The VA wage change mandated by the Nurse Pay Act provides the instrument for the change in the log wage gap ∆(lnwilnwj). We take care in specifying the first stage equation. According to theory, the impact of the VA wage change on ∆(lnwi -lnwj) depends on whether the hospital and its nearest neighbors are VA hospitals and, if not, which VA the hospital is closest to and how far it is from that VA. The estimates in Tables 2, 3, and 4 suggest that the wage growth in any given hospital should be specified as:
where DVA is an indicator for being a VA hospital. In the first stage equation, we wish to estimate the difference in wage growth between a hospital and its two nearest neighbors. Therefore, the appropriate specification for the first stage includes the differences between the hospital and each of its two nearest neighbors. Table A1 provides estimates of the first stage equations for various specifications. The coefficients are generally as expected. F-tests indicate that the instruments are strongly correlated with the change in the wage gap.
Estimates of labor supply elasticities from two-stage least squares estimates of equation (7) are given in Table 5 . The first three columns construct the instruments using the actual wage change at the VA. The first specification does not include the instruments that rely on distance from a VA, while the second specification adds these instruments. Column III adds MSA dummies and a dummy for being a VA to the supply equation. The MSA dummies capture local factors (such as alternative wages) that may influence supply, while the VA dummy captures any common change at the VA that may have made employment more or less attractive at the VA. The remaining three columns of Table 5 repeat these specifications but construct the instruments using the wage gap at the VA in 1990 as a proxy for the actual VA wage change (for reasons discussed earlier). For all specifications, we tested and could not reject the overidentifying restrictions; therefore, our instruments appear appropriate for our model.
The labor supply elasticities estimated in Table 5 are reasonably consistent across specifications. The estimates range from 0 to 0.2, with standard errors of about 0.13. Thus, for the specifications in Table 5 , we estimate an inelastic short-run labor supply curve facing hospitals. Even the high end of the 95% confidence intervals for the labor supply elasticity does not go above 0.5. These estimates of labor supply elasticity are an order of magnitude smaller than those estimated by Sullivan (1989) and Hansen (1992) . Table 6 estimates specifications similar to those in Table 5 , but allows the change in own wage and the change in the nearest competitor's wage to have separate effects rather than constraining them to enter as a difference. 6 If the specifications of Table 5 are correct, own wage and competitor's wage should enter with opposite signed coefficients of the same magnitude. The coefficients are generally opposite signed and the magnitudes are small, with elasticity estimates for these specifications remaining in the 0 to 0.2 range. The only exception is for the specification that includes MSA dummies and the actual change in the VA wage: for this specification the coefficient on the wage change at competitors is poorly identified and the point estimate is wrongsigned. Table 7 investigates the sensitivity of these estimates when the sample is restricted to (1) VA hospitals, (2) non-VA hospitals, (3) hospitals with fewer than five competitors within 15 miles, (4) hospitals with five or more competitors within 15 miles, and (5) hospitals for which the nearest VA had a positive wage gap. The basic conclusions are not particularly sensitive to these sample restrictions. All of the elasticity estimates remain small relative to the previous literature. There is more range in the elasticity estimates for these specifications (from -0.1 to 0.6) but this might be expected given the relatively large standard errors for these specifications relative to those reported in Table 5 .
Discussion
Our analysis provides two pieces of evidence which suggest that hospitals have market power in the nurse labor market and act as monopsonists in setting wages.
First, we find that competing hospitals respond to legislated wage changes at the VA -a ten percent increase in wages at the VA is estimated to have increased wages by two percent at hospitals within 15 miles, and by roughly one percent in hospitals 15-30 miles from the VA. Second, we find that the labor supply curve facing an individual hospital is very inelastic -a ten percent increase in wages is estimated to increase labor supply by between zero and two percent;
These results contradict much of the recent literature investigating monopsony.
This literature has found little (if any) evidence of monopsony power in the labor market. In particular, our estimates of the labor supply elasticity are an order of magnitude below comparable estimates in the literature. This raises the question: Why is this so?
One key difference between this study and others is in the instruments used to identify the supply elasticity. We rely on a legislated change in the wage at the VA as an instrument. Thus, our identification is similar to recent studies of the minimum wage, which also find that legislated changes in wages have small positive effects on employment. Moreover, these legislated changes in wages are arguably ideal instruments for this problem because they come close to simulating the thought experiment that matters for labor supply: how will an exogenous increase in wages affect the VA's ability to attract nurses? The earlier literature used changes in caseload at the hospital as an instrument. As argued earlier, there are reasons to believe that caseload may not be a valid instrument and the potential bias would be in the direction of overstating supply elasticities.
A second difference is our data. We have relied on starting wage data (rather than average wages) which avoids potential aggregation bias that may lead to bias in estimating wage changes. In addition, we are more careful to focus on the difference between a hospital's wages and those of its nearest competitors, while the existing literature has generally measured competing wages as average wages at the county or MSA level. Finally, our estimates rely on data from 1990-92, while both Sullivan (1989) and Hansen (1992) use data from the early and mid 1980s when dramatic changes in hospital reimbursement may have resulted in bias.
Apart from differences in our data and instruments, our focus on VA hospitals may be generating the difference in our findings. Our evidence of market power may be due to the fact that hospitals are a textbook example of monopsony, and VA hospitals are highly differentiated workplaces (by being a federal employer and serving a unique cohort of patients). The supply of nurses might thus be segmented according to RNs' preferences for working or not working at VA facilities, reducing the response of labor supply to the change in the VA wage. On the other hand, it is not clear that the case of a VA hospital is that different from employers in other sectors of the economy. For example, within the fast-food or high-tech industries, workplaces are also highly differentiated in terms of corporate culture and customer base. Therefore, our results may be representative of the monopsony power exercised by many employers.
Our estimates of the short-run labor supply elasticity around 0.1 are quite low.
If these were long-run elasticity estimates, they would imply that the marginal revenue product (MRP) of RNs was about 10 times their wage. However, common sense and most empirical studies (Sullivan, 1989; Hansen, 1992) suggest that long-run elasticities are considerably higher than short-run elasticities. Unfortunately, data were unavailable to examine longer-run supply elasticities. 7 However, if we assume that the long-run elasticity is infinite, then Boal and Ransom (1997) have shown that the amount of "exploitation" -the difference between MRP and the wage as a fraction of the wage -is given by the short-run inverse elasticity of supply multiplied by r/(1+r), where r is the discount rate. Thus, for a discount rate of 5%, our elasticity estimates imply that the MRP of RNs was about 50% above their wages. This evidence, therefore, suggests that firms have considerable monopsony power. where compwage90/2 is as defined in Table A2 . Specifications with "FAR" instruments use first-stage regressions given in columns II, III, V, and VI of Table  A2 . Specifications using "GAP" instruments use first-stage regressions given in column IV-VI of Table A2 . Table A2 . Specifications with "FAR" instruments use the same instruments as in columns II, III, V, and VI of Table A2 , plus the analogous set of variables for the hospital (e.g. not differenced from the competitor). Specifications using "GAP" instruments use the same instruments as in column IV-VI of Table A2 , plus the analogous set of variables for the hospital (e.g. not differenced from the competitor). All regressions are weighted by the number of hospital beds in 1990. Standard errors given in parentheses. All wages refer to starting (lowest) wages of RNs. Change in the log wage gap between a hospital and its two nearest competitors is defined as: [ln(wage92)-ln(wage90)]-[ln(compwage92)-ln(compwage90)] where compwage90/2 is as defined in Table A2 . Specifications with "FAR" instruments use first-stage specifications given in columns II, III, V, and VI of Table A2 . Specifications using "GAP" instruments use first-stage specifications given in column IV-VI of Table A2 . Using the actual change in the log wage at the nearest VA Using the VA log wage gap in 1990 as proxy for wage change at the VA Difference between hospital and nearest competitor in:
(1) Dummy for VA hospital (DVA) All wages refer to starting (lowest) wages of RNs. Wages of competitors (CompWage92,Compwage90) are the average log wage of the hospital's two closest competitors who report wages in both 1990 and 1992. Columns IV-VI use the VA log wage gap in 1990 (log(market wage)-log(VA wage)) in place of the change in the log VA wage in constructing all independent variables. The market wage is constructed as discussed in the footnote to Table 3. 
